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The widespread banking crises since 2007 among advanced economies and the 
“near” default of Greece in 2010 dashed the popular notion that rich countries have 
outgrown severe financial crises.  Record or near-record declines in output accompanying 
these events signaled the end of the short-lived “great moderation era.”2 In fact, graduation 
from recurring sovereign external debt crises is a very tortuous process that sometimes takes 
a century or more.  For banking crises, we simply do not know what it takes to graduate; it is 
unclear whether any country has managed it. 
In our recent paper Qian, Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), we address the elusive concept 
of “graduation” from external default, banking and inflation crises. Employing a data set 
cataloging more than two centuries of financial crises for over sixty countries (developed in 
Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009), we explore the risk of crisis reversals across advanced 
economies and middle- and low-income countries. We show that two decades without a 
relapse is an important marker albeit far from a guarantee against recidivism.  Post 1800, 
roughly two thirds of recurrences of external default, and three quarters of recurrence of 
inflation crisis, have occurred within a twenty-year window.  However, crisis recidivism 
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distributions have very fat tails, so that it takes at least fifty and perhaps longer to 
meaningfully speak of “graduation”. 3  
The main findings of our study can be summarized as follows: 
• The process of “graduation,” defined as the emergence from recurrent crisis bouts, is 
a long drawn-out process. False starts are common and recurrent.  These false starts 
are routinely (mis)interpreted by financial markets and policy makers as evidence the 
countries have really turned the corner quickly because this time is different.  False 
starts are more the norm than the exception in the case of banking crises, for both 
high and middle-low income countries. 
• The vulnerability to crisis in high-income countries versus middle-low income 
countries differs most in external default crises, somewhat less for inflation crises, 
and is surprisingly similar for banking crises. Currency crashes  are also a recurring 
phenomenon in advanced and emerging economies alike. 
• The sequence for most of countries is first to graduate from external default crises, 
then from inflation crises.  
Varieties of financial crises across the ages 
In Table 1, we present a timeline of financial crises that underscores how the 
incidence of a particular strand of crisis (default, inflation and banking) rises and declines 
across the centuries. 
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As the table indicates, between 1550 and 1800, sovereign defaults on external debt 
were relatively common in Europe. Defaults, however, were relatively rare elsewhere if only 
because (a) there were relatively few independent nations outside Europe (not possible to 
have a sovereign default with out being sovereign) and (b) the crude state of global capital 
markets meant that relatively few countries were wealthy enough to attract significant 
international capital flows and have the “luxury” of external debts.  Before 1800, systemic 
banking and inflation crises were relatively rare everywhere because, in the case of the 
former, the legal and technological underpinnings of modern private banking had not reached 
a stage of maturity and, as to the latter, the printing press was not yet in wide use.  Debasing 
coinage required more effort.  
The end of Napoleonic War in the early 1800s marks a significant transition. The 
largest advanced countries were increasingly able to avoid external default partly by their 
ability to issue an increasing share of their debt domestically.  Default, however, became 
common in “peripheral” or newly-independent countries.  Over the same period, advanced 
economies developed more sophisticated banking systems.  As the number of banks grew, so 
did the incidence of banking crises.  The “typical” emerging market did not have a well 
developed domestic financial and relied on external bank and bankers; the co-existence 
during this period of a low incidence of domestic banking crises and a high incidence of 
default on external debts should not be surprising. 
 By the turn of the twentieth century, emerging market financial institutions had 
developed to the point where domestic banking crises became more common.  Due to the 
financial repression that followed the Great Depression, banking crises were relatively rare.  
As financial repression thawed into the early 1970s, banking crises became more frequent in 
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the advanced economies and serial in many emerging markets, bringing us to the recent 
financial crisis episode. 
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Table 1- Varieties of financial crises across the ages, 1550-2010 
1550 frequent in  
 advanced economies
 (including the "world
 powers" of the time)
Napoleonic  Serial in some cases
 wars end 1815
1826 frequent in serial in advanced/ rare
1850 "peripheral' advanced in emerging
1900 economies and most serial in advanced/ more
WWI begins 1913 emerging markets frequent in emerging frequent in advanced 
WWII ends 1945 rare in advanced and and emerging
post-1945 emerging
1964  
1973 frequent in advanced
early 1980s more frequent in and emerging
early 1990s advanced/serial frequent in emerging
2000 Serial in some in emerging
2009 emerging markets  
2010
rare
rare
Inflation
crises
Banking
crises
rare rare
External
debt
crises
??
 
Source: Qian, Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) 
Crisis probabilities: advanced versus emerging middle- and low-income countries 
Table 2 documents the difference between the (advanced) high income countries and 
the emerging economies for the three types of crises.  The largest gap between the two 
country groups is the likelihood of external default. The average external default crisis 
probability of high-income group is less than half that of middle and low income countries 
and almost one fifth that of Latin America. The difference across groups in the incidence of 
high inflation shows a similar pattern. The average probability of  banking crises in the 
advanced and emerging countries, by contrast, are extremely similar. 
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Table 2- Summary statistics of crisis probabilities 
 External Default Inflation Banking 
 Average Std Dev Average Std Dev Average Std Dev 
World 0.19 0.18 0.12 0.12 0.08 0.07 
High-income 0.07 0.13 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.04 
Middle and low 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.11 0.09 
Difference (middle 
less high) 0.12  0.11  0.04   
Memorandum item: 
      
  Of which Latin      
America 
0.34 0.13 0.12 0.07 0.04 0.03 
Source: Qian, Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) 
 
Banking crises are “an equal opportunity menace” (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009, 
chapter 10).  Banking crises picked up dramatically in emerging markets since 1980, and as 
is well-known these have flourished in rich countries since 2007 as well.  At present, neither 
high nor middle-low income countries have imminent prospects of meeting the criteria for 
“graduation” from banking crises.  
The risk of a reversal: Tranquil periods between crises 
We next examine the frequency distribution of “tranquil” periods.  How long, on 
average, is it before one crisis episode ends and the next crisis begins? Figure 1 gives the 
statistics separately for external default, inflation and banking crises.  The frequencies are 
broadly similar across different types of crises, with a significant share of distribution falling 
between ten and twenty years. However, the fat tails of the distributions highlight that twenty 
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years without a default, banking or inflation crisis is hardly decisive evidence of 
“graduation”.  
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Figure 1- Duration of “tranquil time” 
 
Source: Qian, Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) 
For external defaults, most emerging market recurrences happen within twenty years, 
only a few countries that have once defaulted have avoided any further defaults, at least not 
long enough to pass the 50-year filter we use.  For inflation and banking crises, the twenty 
year mark contains an even larger percentage of reversals and, at the same time, the cases 
where there are of no reversal (or recurrence) are scarce.  
To gain a deeper insight into recidivism – or its complement, graduation -- we look at 
measures of distance since the last crisis.  As shown in Figure 2, the median tranquil period 
for default is just over a century for the advance countries (105 years) versus only 14 years 
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for the developing countries.4  The world median is 23 years. For banking crises, the median 
for the advanced countries is 9 versus 12 years for the developing countries.  
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 The 105-year tranquil spell for advanced economies is calculated including 211-year entries (1800-2010) for 
countries which never defaulted or had an inflation crisis during this sample.  
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Figure 2 – Years since last external default through 2010, (or since 1800 or year of 
independence if there are no defaults) 
 
 
Source: Qian, Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) 
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Reflections  
Because financial crises tend to occur only at very long periodicities, it is easy to 
forget that they happen at all.  Across a large data set, we find that two decades without a 
crisis is an important market to signal the “first step” toward graduation but that there are still 
relatively high odds of relapsing into crisis, even after several decades of tranquility. 
Premature declarations of victory are all too common.  Argentina’s poster child status 
among the international as late as 1998-1999 (on the eve of disaster) is an illustration of this 
tendency.  Rich countries do seem significantly less likely to default on external debt, though 
of course part of their :graduation” is a by-product of being able to fund themselves 
internally in domestically issued debt,  or,  in the case of Greece recently, in being a part of a 
wealthy club that can help support a bail out. When it comes to banking crises we state the 
obvious; the post-2007 resurgence of these makes plain that, to date,  it is not  possible to 
meaningfully speak of “graduation”.  Indeed, the post-World War II-2006 period was the 
exception rather than the rule in our 211-year sample for the relative absence among 
advanced economies of banking crises. 
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